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Introduction to the Symposium by Thibaud Boncourt 
The following contributions stem from a roundtable held in Poznan, Poland in July 2016 at the 
International Political Science Association’s Congress. The roundtable was put together by IPSA’s 
Research Committee 33, which focuses on the history of political science as a discipline. 
Contributors produced a stimulating debate on Robert Adcock’s award winning Liberalism and the 
Emergence of Political Science: A Transatlantic Tale. 
As its title suggests, this important book weaves two narratives together. First, it sheds a new light 
on the history of liberalism, by highlighting the way in which liberal political thought changed 
between the early 19th century and the early 20th century. Adcock highlights the transition from 
“democratised classical liberalism” to alternative conceptions of the liberal tradition such as 
“progressive liberalism” and “disenchanted classical liberalism”. Second, the book documents the 
history of the emergence of American political science. By studying the pioneers of this discipline, 
Adcock analyses the progressive spread and institutionalisation of political science in America until 
the landmark creation of the American Political Science Association (APSA, 1903). 
These two stories are interesting in themselves but what makes Adcock’s argument more so is that 
he weaves these two trends together. He shows convincingly how the development of one of the 
biggest political discourses and the institutionalisation of political science fuelled one another. By 
linking the history of the discipline to that of political power, Adcock’s impressive study resonates 
with other great work on the subject such as those of Sonja Amadae (2003) and Nicolas Guilhot 
(2005). 
Another of the book’s strengths lies in the choice of adopting a transatlantic perspective. In line 
with recent literature, Adcock goes beyond narratives of intellectual history as shaped by “national 
 
Symposium on Adcock 
Serendipities 12.2017 (2): 237–256 | DOI 10.25364/11.2:2017.2.4 238 
traditions” to emphasise the transnational exchanges that shape the history of political thought. 
Thus, Adcock first traces the history of liberalism in Europe, before analysing how it was imported 
in American academia. The book tells the story of the “Americanisation” of liberalism, understood 
as the way in which European liberal beliefs were adapted by American scholars to address 
American political and economic realities.  
In order to discuss several aspects of this stimulating, multi-layered book, the roundtable gathered 
specialists in the history of political thought, history of political science as a discipline, and the 
internationalisation of the social sciences. The following three contributions raise some of the 
topics that were discussed at the roundtable, as well as new ones. Robert Adcock’s rejoinder 
discusses these topics by expanding on the book’s argument. (All references in the text refer to 
Adcock 2014a, if not stated otherwise.) 
Comments by Emily Hauptmann 
emily.hauptmann@wmich.edu 
Each time I have revisited Adcock’s Liberalism and the Emergence of Political Science, I have been 
drawn to different themes and questions. This is a multi-layered book; re-readings reveal different 
aspects of it rather than reinforcing one central notion of what the book is about. I say this to 
explain why I’m offering a substantially different set of remarks in this forum than I did at our 
roundtable last summer. At that meeting, I had raised questions about Adcock’s historiographical 
reasons for attributing various liberalisms to his central cast of not-yet-self-identified-liberal 19th c. 
characters and for declining to make “American exceptionalism” a prominent feature in his account 
of their early political science. Because I think Adcock answered my questions fully last summer, I 
felt it might be better to ask a few new ones. So I returned to his book once more. When I did so, I 
realized that I had not fully engaged with the book as a narrative about political science nor with 
Adcock’s account of the part political scientists played in the intellectual and political life of the 
U.S. 
In that spirit, I have recast my comments to prompt Adcock to expand on the implications of his 
argument that 19th c. U.S. political scientists were crucial agents in the development of liberalism. If 
I understand Adcock’s argument correctly, he claims that although Lieber, Sumner, Lowell and 
others did not call themselves liberals, they should nonetheless be seen as the first “agents” in the 
“Americanization” of liberalism (2, 281). As Adcock shows, when European liberals articulated 
what liberalism meant to them, they did so in part by offering assessments of American democracy. 
This wasn’t an exclusively European conversation, however; American political scientists also took 
part in it, developing their own ideas about the relation between liberalism and democracy. So 
while liberalism didn’t come into full political currency in the U.S. until the early 20th c., Adcock 
urges us to read 19th c. political scientists’ transatlantic exchanges with European liberals as a 
preface to its later emergence.  
This account casts 19th c. political scientists in a role crucial to the development of a 20th c. liberal 
American political culture. Not only does Adcock portray political scientists as the first importers 
and adapters of European liberalism in the U.S.; he also suggests that the varieties of liberalism 
they cultivated and hybridized in the academy “prefigure[d]” (275) the forms it would later take in 
American political discourse. The importation and adaptation part of this story is told in 
meticulous detail throughout the book. Readers learn a great deal not only about the views of 
 
Symposium on Adcock 
Serendipities 12.2017 (2): 237–256 | DOI 10.25364/11.2:2017.2.4 239 
Lieber, Sumner, Lowell and Wilson but also about the European liberalisms with which they 
engaged.  
In my view, however, the second part of the story—how the liberalisms cultivated by U.S. political 
scientists prepared the ground for the development of the liberal political culture of the early 20th 
c.—isn’t told nearly as fully as the first. This is, I acknowledge, partly because the book’s principal 
historical narrative ends with the founding of the American Political Science Association in 1903. 
Still, to stress, as Adcock does, that 19th c. political scientists should be seen as the “lead agents of 
the Americanization of liberalism,” implies that these academics set a discourse in motion that was 
later taken up by a wider array of people in public life. At least that’s what highlighting the agency 
of these 19th c. political scientists suggests to me.  
Perhaps, however, this overstates the role Adcock believes 19th c. political scientists played in 
setting the terms of 20th c. U.S. political discourse. In other passages in his conclusion, Adcock 
portrays the relation between political scientists’ incipient liberalisms and what came into wider 
political currency in the first decades of the 20th c. much more tentatively, saying that their 
adaptations of European liberalism merely “prefigure[d]” or lent themselves to being “mapped 
onto” (275, 276) what liberalism came to mean in 20th c. U.S. politics. So were early political 
scientists “lead agents of the Americanization of liberalism”? That is, did they help format the 
shape of later U.S. political discourse? Or are the similarities Adcock notices between them too 
faint to   register as influence?  
I’m trying to do more here than split hairs. Even if answering these questions fully would pull the 
narrative further into the 20th c. than  intended, I think these formulations  invite some further 
questions about how Adcock understands the relation of early political scientists to public life. On 
the one hand, as Adcock notes, many 19th c. U.S. political scientists sought public office; only the 
prominence of the offices Woodrow Wilson held, therefore, was unusual, not his pursuit of them... 
Moreover, the political involvement of its members was affirmed and encouraged by the American 
Political Science Association at its founding. But on the other hand, the professionalization of the 
social sciences that began in the late 19th c. is often read as a deliberate retreat from the public 
engagement of earlier generations, an attempt to win legitimacy as experts on social and political 
life by speaking from a space above the partisan political fray. And this more guarded view of how 
early political scientists engaged in public life is one I believe Adcock also affirms (cf. 272–274). 
These two somewhat incompatible claims about political scientists’ political involvement lead me 
to extend one of my earlier questions about how Adcock understands the relation between 19th c. 
political scientists and 20th c. U.S. political liberalism: If political scientists were indeed the “lead 
agents” of the liberalism that so profoundly shaped American political life, in what venues and by 
what means did they exercise that agency?  
I am aware that my questions focus on a claim advanced most fully in the book’s conclusion rather 
than one developed in its core. In my defence, I would cite the depth and completeness with which 
Adcock treats his principal themes as  my license to ask such “what happened next?,” questions. 
Those interested in the history of political science have much to learn from this book–and from 
what Adcock chooses to do next.  
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Comments by Erkki Berndtson 
erkki.berndtson@gmail.com 
Liberalism and the Emergence of American Political Science is one of the most important studies 
on the history of social sciences in recent years. Its focus on the relationship between liberalism 
and the emergence of political science as a discipline in the 19th century United States is not itself 
new, as this relationship has been discussed in earlier studies (e.g. Crick 1959; Ceaser 1990). 
However, Adcock’s book differs from earlier studies in two ways. First, he frames his analysis using 
a transatlantic and comparative perspective, looking at how American scholars interacted with 
British, German and French scholars and how they learned from each other. Secondly, he analyses 
the relationship between liberalism and political science through varieties of liberalism, offering “a 
history structured in terms of, …, multiple liberalisms” (3). The early 19th century study of politics 
was a product of democratized classical liberalism, but political scientists of the late 19th century 
were mostly progressive liberals or disenchanted classical liberals. In this sense, the book is a 
critique of Crick’s classic study of American political science, as Crick understood liberalism as a 
monolithic ideology. Adcock presents “pioneering political scientists as helping to import ‘the 
liberal tradition’ into American thought and Americanize it, whereas for Crick ‘the liberal tradition’ 
was a ‘pre-existent consensus’” (5-6). 
The book also contains many other new insights for the study of the history of political science, 
which make reading the book rewarding. For instance, Adcock’s “central” argument that the study 
of politics and the transformation of liberalism were framed by changing political and economic 
realities, “the spread of democratic belief in popular sovereignty and the political capacity of the 
common man”, and secondly, “the growth of large-scale industry, which altered the structure and 
power of social classes while confronting governments with novel policy demands” (3), allows him 
to analyze the study of politics in a wider perspective. It is essential to notice how important 
historical research and political economy were to the study of politics, as the discipline was 
transformed from a wide political science of the early 19th century to a narrow political science of 
the late 19th century. As Adcock argues, paying attention especially to the role of political economy 
in the history of the discipline is a novel move (10). 
Adcock’s book is a rich and detailed study and it contains many interesting things to discuss. In the 
following, however, I will pay attention only to two major questions which need more critical 
scrutiny: liberalism and the transatlantic perspective, and secondly, the origins of a narrow 
political science with reference to other disciplines. 
Liberalism and the transatlantic perspective. If Crick understood American liberalism as a 
monolithic ideology, Adcock, on the other hand seems to downplay the importance of the liberal 
heritage in the United States. It must be remembered that political thinkers who laid the 
foundation for liberalism (e.g. Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu) were an important part of teaching 
already at colonial colleges (see Haddow 1939). And, of course, The Federalist Papers and the U.S. 
Constitution are a mixture of liberal political thinking and republican political theory (e.g. Lienesch 
1988). In that sense, there was a liberal political tradition in the United States already before 
Adcock’s “transatlantic tale”. 
I agree with Adcock that the interaction between American and European scholars was important 
for the development of political science as a discipline. However, the problem is that what was 
liberal and what was conservative political thinking and action during the 19th century it is a matter 
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of interpretation. Political ideologies and political systems, in the sense we know them today, were 
only coming into existence. From today’s perspective, the arguments in the first chapter of the book 
(The “Political” in Political Science. The Liberal Debate about Democracy) are easy to understand 
and accept, as the chapter discusses, the ideas of, e. g. Francois Guizot, Benjamin Constant, Alexis 
de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. 
The second chapter (The “Science” in Political Science. The Historicist Debate about Method) is 
more problematic. In the chapter, Adcock discusses the methodological tradition he labels as 
developmental historicism. Later in the book, he shows how historicism was an important part of 
the American study of politics. However, when he attempts to weave together the “science” and the 
“political” in European thinking, he runs into difficulties. Using Johann Bluntschli, Henry Maine 
and Edward Freeman as examples, Adcock argues that, “[t]ogether these three Europeans 
exemplified both political variety within liberalism and methodological variety within 
developmental historicism, relative to which I will subsequently analyze American figures” (43). 
However, of these three, only Freeman can be said to have been a liberal, as he was a historian and 
a liberal politician. The ideas of Henry Maine, on the other hand, have usually been interpreted as 
having a conservative rather than a liberal bent. In addition, Johan Bluntchli had represented a 
moderate conservative party in Switzerland in his youth, and although he had liberal nationalist 
sympathies later in Germany, he can also be described as a racist and anti-feminist (which, of 
course, applied to many other European and American scholars as well).  
In that sense, conservatism and liberalism mixed with each other in many ways. Germany is a good 
example, not only because the majority of American scholars went there to study in the late 19th 
century. German political liberalism became divided in the 1860s into “progressive liberalism” and 
“national liberalism”, the latter group accepting many of Chancellor Bismarck’s economic policies 
during the 1870s. However, when Bismarck adopted protectionist policies after 1879, the relations 
between him and liberals waned. After that, the National Liberal Party’s left wing merged with the 
Progressive Party and the remaining party members approached the Conservatives. The question 
now is, how did American political scientists understand these varieties of German liberalism when 
studying in Germany and after returning home? Most German liberals favored free trade, as did 
American scholars, but it was Bismarck as a Chancellor who developed social legislation which 
many American progressive liberals also favored. The question is, what kind of liberals were the 
main characters in Adcock’s tale, such as, Francis Lieber, William Graham Sumner, John W. 
Burgess, A. Lawrence Lowell, and even Woodrow Wilson? Could the title of Adcock’s book have 
been Liberalism, Conservatism and the Emergence of American Political Science? The 
development of political science can also be analyzed as a struggle between liberalism and 
conservatism (with radicalism in the background). 
From wide to narrow political science. Analyzing the emergence of political science as an 
academic discipline, Adcock pays attention to the study of history and political economy which 
were important parts of the study of politics (wide political science) before political science 
developed into a distinct narrow academic discipline. In many ways, as Adcock is well aware of, the 
development from wide political science to a narrow one was due to specialization. Before the Civil 
War colleges were small. One scholar specializing in politics hardly made a discipline. It was no 
wonder that the study of politics was grouped together with other subjects, in many cases, political 
economy, history and/or law. On the other hand, the scholars themselves were interested in 
various topics and did not identify themselves solely as historians, economists, legal scholars or 
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political scientists. The growth of universities led to specialization. It was not only political 
scientists who wanted to become specialists. As Anna Haddow has shown, 
“Moral philosophy, the old vehicle for teaching politics, was changing into ethics in the modern 
sense and was losing most of its former great interest in political forms and obligations. The study 
of law was being separated from its early connections with the study of philosophy and politics, and 
becoming a technical and analytical study of American law, designed for the budding practitioner 
rather than the educated citizen. Political economy was coming forward rapidly as a distinct 
subject, later to be called “economics”, with a primary interest in the production, distribution, and 
consumption of economic goods. History was progressing more slowly, and its attention was being 
given mainly to political and constitutional developments. The teachers of philosophy, law and 
political economy were, therefore, deserting the field of politics to concentrate upon their special 
interests, while the teachers of history were beginning to encourage political and constitutional 
studies. Later, when the historians turned more to cultural, social, and economic history, the field 
of political studies was left more definitely to the specialized group of political scientists (Haddow 
1939: 167). 
In spite of this, law was still an important framework for political scientists when the American 
Political Science Association was founded in 1903. The legal emphasis in the study of politics was 
natural as many political scientists at that time had a legal education. It is odd that Adcock does not 
pay any attention to this. As Westel Woodbury Willoughby, the first Secretary of the American 
Political Science Association wrote in his 1904 Report of the Secretary, “[i]n order to cover 
effectively the whole field of Political Science, the Association will distribute its work among 
sections, devoted respectively to such topics as International Law and Diplomacy, Comparative 
Legislation, Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Administration, 
Politics, and Political Theory” (Willoughby 1904: 27). 
In the same manner, Frank J. Goodnow, the first President of the American Political Science 
Association, stated in his 1904 Presidential address that until the formation of the Association 
there had existed no other association which had assembled “on a common ground those persons 
whose main interests were connected with the scientific study of the organization and functions of 
the state” and “one of the most important objects of the association is just this study of the public 
law. For it is only by a study of law, sometimes a most detailed study, that we can arrive at an 
accurate idea of the form and methods of a governmental system. Indeed, it is very doubtful 
whether one can be a political scientist in any sense without a knowledge of the law governing the 
systems subject to study” (Goodnow 1904: 42). 
To understand the legal emphasis of early political scientists is important for two reasons. First, 
when a narrow political science was formed, the most pressing political problems were 
constitutional and administrative (which Adcock acknowledges through his analysis of the writings 
of Woodrow Wilson and Frank J. Goodnow). In that sense, the third changing political reality 
influencing the study of politics was the functioning of political institutions at the time when a 
“New American State” was built (Skowronek 1982). 
 
The second reason for the need to understand the role of public law in the history of political 
science is that it gave a systematic framework to the study of political systems. This argument 
differs from Adcock’s interpretation that it was James Bryce, whose “The American 
 
Symposium on Adcock 
Serendipities 12.2017 (2): 237–256 | DOI 10.25364/11.2:2017.2.4 243 
Commonwealth deserves to be hailed, or harangue, as the grounding work of this new kind of 
political science” (235). However, as Bernard Crick already argued, Bryce’s use of facts was non-
theoretical and his influence on American political scientists was ambiguous. Bryce was skeptical 
about general ideas in the study of politics and his advice to ‘stay close to the facts’, probably meant 
something different to Americans than it meant to him, as Americans were becoming increasingly 
possessed by a general idea of politics (Crick 1959: 113-117). In that sense, it was public law and 
legal reasoning that gave political scientists theoretical means to focus on politics systematically. 
In conclusion. There is still one open question which needs to be asked. If the emergence of 
American political science was due to the transatlantic interaction between American and 
European liberal scholars, why did the narrow political science not develop in Britain, Germany or 
France in the 19th century? Maybe Crick was right after all when he argued that political science 
was an American idea, rooted in American culture. It was born out of a peculiar relationship 
between a common sense of science, the idea of citizenship training, the habits of American 
democracy, and embracing all these, the belief in an inevitable progress or manifest destiny for 
American society (Crick 1959: xv). This may well at least be part of the explanation for the 
question, why a distinct discipline of political science began to develop in the United States during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries and not in Europe. The notion of American “exceptionalism” still 
has its merits in understanding intellectual developments in the United States. 
Comments by Thibaud Boncourt 
t.boncourt@gmail.com 
I will not go back to the many qualities of Robert Adcock’s Liberalism and the Emergence of 
Political Science, raised both during the roundtable and in the introduction to this symposium. 
Like all stimulating studies, Adcock’s book answers as many questions as it opens new avenues for 
research. In the following, I would like to prompt Adcock to reflect on some of these avenues and 
elaborate on some aspects of his argument. 
(1) When reading the book, I first reflected on Adcock’s use of the term “liberalism”. When using 
such categories, authors tend to chose one of two options. Some start from their own 
understanding of liberalism and project it unto the past, so that they are the ones who decide what 
belongs to liberalism and what does not. Others reject this a priori approach to let actors 
themselves define what they are and, in particular, whether they situate themselves within a given 
intellectual tradition (in this case, liberalism) or not—and, correlatively, whether they are relevant 
to the story told.  
Unconventionally, Adcock choses to do both. He first “introduces liberalism with reference to what 
the words ‘liberalism’ and ‘liberal’ meant as they first entered into political use in early- to mid-
nineteenth-century Europe”. He then “[carries] the [European] language of ‘liberalism’ with [him]” 
as he moves across the Atlantic to tell the American part of his story, even though “‘liberal’ and 
‘liberalism’ lacked resonance in nineteenth-century American politics” (7). These choices contrast 
with those he makes in the case of the label “political science”. When tracing the origins of the 
discipline in America, Adcock looks for the institutional uses of the term “political science”, i.e. in 
“the naming, first of academic chairs, then of schools and departments, and finally the APSA” (10-
11). 
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This leads me to prompt Adcock to reflect on the consequences of these choices for his narrative or, 
in other words, on the alternative book he could have written had he fully embraced an approach 
focused on the uses by actors themselves of the labels he is interested in. This is tantamount to 
asking why the term “liberalism” took time to gain currency in American political debates and who 
were those who first fully embraced it, while some of their contemporaries did not. 
(2) A second, related point is the way in which the book approaches intellectual history. Adcock 
pays tribute to the “conceptual approach” notably promoted by James Farr and John Gunnell, 
which approaches the history of political science through that of the concepts used by political 
scientists. While Adcock’s book contains rich conceptual discussions, it also veers away from this 
approach by studying the institutionalisation of the discipline into academic departments, chairs, 
and professional associations, and by tracing the sociological connections between some of the 
actors of his history. For example, in a fascinating Chapter 3, Adcock shows that intellectual 
exchanges between Francis Lieber, the earliest occupant of a chair of “political science” in 
America’s academy, and Alexis de Tocqueville, were fuelled by an enduring friendship forged 
during Tocqueville’s tour of America. Intellectual exchanges were, thus, supported by the tangible 
circulation of authors across the Atlantic and their interactions. 
This sociological picture, however, is sometimes incomplete. While the book provides an 
impressive picture of the intellectual debates of the time (what Pierre Bourdieu called the “space of 
positions-takings”), the sociological connections between relevant actors (the “field of positions”) 
and the concrete channels through which ideas circulate are not always made explicit. When 
Chapter 2 describes, for example, the intellectual proximities between Benjamin Constant on the 
European side and James Kent on the American side, the discussion stays at the conceptual level. 
Can we identify key translations, interactions, or forums through which ideas circulated? Did some 
of these scholars form tangible transnational networks? 
(3) Key to Adcock’s argument is the idea that early political scientists played an instrumental role 
in the emergence of an American blend of liberalism that profoundly shaped US political life in the 
twentieth century. However, while the “Americanisation” of liberalism in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century is described in detail, the impact and legacy of this process is less clear. In 
her comments, Emily Hauptmann asks how early political scientists became “lead agents” of 
liberalism. In addition to this, I wonder how the processes that Adcock describes relate to later 
interactions between American political science and democracy. Stimulating research, by Adcock 
and others, on the development of behavioralist political science between the 1940s and 1970s, has 
highlighted the close connections between this paradigm and the defence of the American model of 
pluralist liberal democracy. Did Lieber, Lowell and the other protagonists of Adcock’s history 
prefigure these developments? How do later dominant conceptions of liberalism differ from the 
blends identified in the book? In other words, how structuring are the processes described in the 
book for the later histories of American political science and liberalism, and their interactions? 
Some of these comments go, of course, way beyond the main topic of Adcock’s study. I hope that 
they can still be part of a discussion that does justice to the quality, depth, and innovativeness of a 
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Response by Robert Adcock 
adcockrk@gmail.com 
It is a privilege to have this opportunity to respond to these three excellent commentaries on my 
Liberalism and the Emergence of American Political Science: A Transatlantic Tale (2014a). Let 
me begin by expressing my great gratitude to Thibaud Boncourt for organizing the International 
Political Science Association roundtable on the book and now this successor symposium, and to 
Emily Hauptmann and Erkki Berndtson for joining Boncourt in engaging with my work so very 
thoughtfully in person and now print. In beginning her commentary Hauptmann generously 
describes the book as “multi-layered” in the array of themes and questions that it touches on. 
Turning her description into a metaphor, I worry that this array is all too akin to a display of 
artifacts from an archaeological dig presented without information about what layer of the dig they 
came from. I will hence use this response in part as an opportunity to provide some background 
information on how my approach and themes shifted during the course of the almost a decade and 
a half of research and writing that culminated in the book. First, I discuss a dimension of the book 
that I remain especially happy with: my approach to political science. Second, I revisit my 
transatlantic perspective, where the commentaries spur me to articulate some broader conjectures 
implicit at best in the book itself. Finally, I address the methodological and substantive questions 
raised by the commentaries regarding my treatment of liberalism. Framing the book around such a 
fraught and variously interpreted ideological label has always made me anxious. I welcome the 
chance to reflect here on the choices underpinning my approach to liberalism, and to speculate 
upon issues raised by my all-too-preliminary concluding comments on the Americanization of 
liberalism. 
 
POLITICAL SCIENCE WITH ADJECTIVES: “WIDE,” “NARROW,” AND “NEW” POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Any historian of political science who looks back before the institutional watershed of the 1903 
founding of the American Political Science Association (APSA) faces challenges regarding: 1) which 
figures fall within their remit, and, 2) what aggregate category to use when formulating more 
general claims. I started my research under the influence of three approaches. Revisiting political 
science’s pre-APSA pioneers has been part of the American discipline’s discourse about itself since 
Charles Merriam first told a disciplinary history almost a century ago.1 Figures he attended to, such 
as Francis Lieber and John Burgess, subsequently retained their prominence through generations 
of disciplinary histories down into the works of John Gunnell and James Farr, who inspired me as 
the latest most methodologically sophisticated practitioners of the genre I aimed to contribute to. I 
was also, however, informed by intellectual historian Dorothy Ross’s use of “historico-politics” as 
an aggregate grouping that situated Lieber and Burgess in a broader nineteenth-century field of 
knowledge only divided between political science and history in the era of APSA’s formation 
(Adcock 2003). Ross called my attention to figures like Andrew D. White (the first president of the 
American Historical Association, AHA) not usually accorded a major role in political science’s 
disciplinary histories. Finally, I was further inspired by Bernard Crick’s examination of sociologists 
William Graham Sumner and Lester Frank Ward in his study of what he called “the American 
 
1 For my views on the development of disciplinary history in political science see Adcock 2014b. Seeing that edited 
volume chapter as a meta-accompaniment to my book, I said relatively little about my relationship to my precursors in 
the book itself, instead trying to move quickly on to beginning my own narrative due to my stylistic preference for 
histories that do this and leave fuller discussions of meta-issues for other venues (such as this symposium!). 
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science of politics”. Blending these influences, my dissertation identified its overall remit as the 
“American science of politics” (seen to potentially include any American writing on politics with a 
scientific self-identity). Within that all-too-amorphous remit I more specifically studied and 
compared: 1) Crick’s sociologists with 2) traditional disciplinary history figures grouped alongside 
other figures of Ross’s historico-politics. 
I formulated the institutional approach to political science Boncourt highlights only as I rethought 
my project post-dissertation. The immediate spur came from finding that Sumner had been hired 
in the early 1870s as Yale’s “Chair of Political and Social Science,” and his introductory lecture had 
differentiated between political science in “its narrower and its wider significance” (Adcock 2014a: 
113-14). Its wider sense, whose scope was similar to what would come to be called the “social 
sciences,” was also formally institutionalized in the naming of the “School of Political Science” 
opened at Columbia in 1880. Focusing on these formal institutional uses, I dropped the “American 
science of politics” (as well as Ross’s “historico-politics”) as aggregate categories. I reframed my 
work instead in terms of an older “wide political science” and a narrower offspring of it 
institutionalized with APSA’s founding. Attending to institutions and their naming enabled me to 
identify my remit more precisely as American academics employed in a chair, department, or 
school with “political science” as part of its title (even if the later differentiation of the social 
sciences has led some figures to be seen retrospectively as historians, economists, or sociologists, 
rather than political scientists). The institutional approach I settled on led to a major exclusion—I 
dropped Ward for my book—as well as a pivotal inclusion—I added Richard T. Ely and via him the 
attention to political economy that Berndtson generously highlights as a novel move of mine. 
I was and remain satisfied with my institutional approach. Attaching the adjective “wide” before 
political science provides a category under which to group pre-APSA figures that is compatible with 
Gunnell and Farr’s methodological call to attend to the historical use of language, especially when 
that usage differs from our own. But as sensitive to past use as I hoped to be, it should also be 
stressed that in choosing my category and a boundary criterion for it I consciously constructed a 
particular perspective on the past. That perspective pointed my research in some directions (for 
example, toward political economy), but also—as all perspectives must—cast other facets of the 
past into shadow. Berndtson’s observation that I overlook the role of public law in the emergence of 
American political science compellingly shines a light on one such area of shadow. Law schools 
began to be founded in the American academy (for example, Harvard’s Law School in 1817 and 
Yale’s in 1824) several decades before chairs, department, or schools with “political science” in 
their titles. In focusing on the latter, I looked away from academic training in law. While a reader of 
my book would, I hope, be unsurprised that the young APSA repeatedly gave its presidency to 
figures who served at other times as AHA presidents, nothing in the book would prepare readers 
for how many early APSA presidents had an advanced degree from a law school and what this says 
about the character of political science at that time. 
I have no regrets about having consciously written a history of American political science from a 
perspective, but Berndtson’s comments make me wish I had been more explicit about decisions 
built into that perspective. Alongside my institutional approach, my approach to political science 
also incorporated a further decision that I left implicit. During my research I came to believe that 
the disciplinary history genre has focused too much on the Columbia School of Political Science 
and its founder John Burgess at the expense of other institutions and individuals. I suspect this is 
due to the genre carrying forward focuses first articulated by Charles Merriam, who saw his field’s 
emergence through a lens shaped by his PhD training at Columbia. As a revisionary corrective I 
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made moves in my book to lower the relative profile of the Columbia School and its founder. 
Cornell’s White and Yale’s Sumner got central billing in Chapter 4, with Columbia’s slightly later 
School of Political Science not introduced until mid-chapter, and unmentioned in its title. Chapter 
5, in turn, jumped ahead to 1880s developments at Hopkins and led by its faculty. My revisionary 
moves contributed to downplaying public law because ties between the law school and political 
science at Columbia were especially (I think exceptionally, Berndtson might disagree) close at 
Columbia. Public law was notably prominent in the first two books of the “Systematic Series edited 
by the University Faculty of Political Science”: Burgess’s Political Science and Comparative 
Constitutional Law (1891) and Frank Goodnow’s Comparative Administrative Law (1893). I 
discuss both books in Chapter 8, but in a way that advances my revisionary push. I argue there that 
Burgess’s book was poorly received and notably less influential than Bryce’s American 
Commonwealth, and that Goodnow’s approach shifted between his 1893 book and his Politics and 
Administration (1900) in ways that specifically illuminate Bryce’s influence.  
My revisionist moves regarding Columbia and Burgess thus shaped two features of the book that 
Berndtson questions: the relative absence of public law and relative prominence of Bryce. I hope 
our exchange helps readers to consider my Chapter 8 with a fuller awareness of what I aimed at. 
But I trust that the chapter’s documenting of changes in works by Harvard’s A. Lawrence Lowell 
and Goodnow as each began to employ Bryce’s “political system” approach provides solid evidence 
of Bryce’s influence in American political science (on my reading it was no accident that Bryce, like 
Goodnow and Lowell, served as an early APSA president, while Burgess played no role). I remain 
convinced there was much right in Lowell’s crediting of Bryce as “the master and guide of all 
students of modern political systems” (Adcock 2014a: 267). Judging the relative influence of late-
19th century figures matters, in turn, for how we plot the subsequent trajectory of political science 
in America. Consider the subtitle of Somit and Tanenhaus’s (1967) The Development of American 
Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism. If we instead used the transatlantic figure of 
Bryce to set up the trajectory “From Bryce to Behavioralism” we would see significant 
continuities—not least the concept of the “political system”—that question the characterization of 
behavioralism as a revolution wielded by its proponents and later its critics (Adcock 2007). 
While disagreeing with Berndtson over Bryce’s influence, his challenge has made me all too aware 
of conceptual ambiguity in my addition of adjectives to political science. When adding adjectives 
intended to flag a contrast with “wide political science,” I switch between “new” and “narrow” in 
discussing political science during the period of the APSA’s founding. This may obscure the fact 
that, while the association’s remit was narrower than “wide political science” had been, it carried 
forward strands of scholarship from its precursor—such as public law and institutional history—
that were far from new. What I meant to flag with the phrase “new political science” in Chapter 8 
was only the new strand of work on modern political systems I credit Bryce with inaugurating. I 
believe this differed significantly from older strands of public law and institutional history. But all 
found a home together in the APSA. So, to clarify my adjectives: “new” political science was only 
one strand of “narrow” political science as institutionalized in the APSA. 
 
A TRANSATLANTIC TALE: FLESHING OUT MY PERSPECTIVE WITH CONJECTURES 
I subtitled the book “A Transatlantic Tale” with the hope of flagging two transatlantic concerns in a 
single phrase. First, as all three commentaries discuss, I was concerned to situate pioneering 
American political scientists in transatlantic intellectual exchanges with British, French, and/or 
German figures. Second, I sought to stress the role played in the work of these political scientists by 
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transatlantic comparisons that located America relative to developments in European nations. My 
introduction explicitly tied the book to the rising trend of historians supplementing, or even 
supplanting, national with transnational narratives. But reading the commentaries makes me fear 
that in hitching myself to the transnational turn in history, I directed readers’ expectations toward 
exchanges at the expense of comparisons. In revisiting my transatlantic perspective here, I first 
take up Boncourt’s question about how I treat transatlantic ties, and then Berndtson’s question 
about APSA’s founding, which he crisply poses using a transatlantic comparison. Both questions 
have pushed me to think about issues I did not engage in the book, and in responding I try out 
some conjectures more sweeping than anything my own research alone could substantiate. 
Beside conceptual and institutional approaches, Boncourt also sees a sociological approach in my 
work, specifically when I trace transatlantic connections between actors. He observes, however, 
that I do this to differing extent with different figures. Contrasting Chapter 3’s tracing of Lieber-
Tocqueville ties to my earlier noting of Kent-Constant parallels without associated transatlantic 
links, Boncourt asks whether there would be such links. The contrast here arises from my chapter 
structure, in which Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 give broad brush framing portraits of “liberalism” and 
“historicism,” with specific figures invoked intermittently for illustrative purposes. Only in Chapter 
3 with Lieber—the first figure that my institutional approach categorizes as a pioneering American 
political scientist—did I first pursue the research needed to supplement summaries of arguments 
with details about transatlantic ties. Pondering Boncourt’s question now has, however, pushed me 
to step back from my (over)-embrace of the transatlantic turn. Rather than assuming significant 
transatlantic ties waiting to be found for Kent-Constant, I would instead assume that the extent of 
transatlantic links evolved historically in connection with technological changes and war/peace, 
and on this basis I would conjecture that transatlantic links were sparser in the era of Constant and 
Kent than they became through the course of the rest of the nineteenth century. 
Let me motivate (without claiming to substantiate) this conjecture. Looking back now across the 
chapters (3 to 8) in which I situate pioneering American political scientists in transatlantic links, I 
am struck by how much more extensive links were in later chapters. For example, a network 
diagram of the ties with multiple American scholars cultivated by Bryce over his 1870, 1881, and 
1883-84 trips to America, and his later service as British ambassador (1907-1913), would be much 
larger than a diagram of Tocqueville’s ties from his single 1831-32 visit. Without dwelling on this in 
the book itself, I choose for my cover a map of transatlantic steamship and telegraph routes. These 
technologies transformed cross-oceanic communication between Tocqueville’s era and Bryce’s (the 
timing of this communications revolution and its influence on British liberal thought about 
international relations is explored in Bell 2007 and 2016). Alongside technological change, I would 
also expect that war vs. peace influenced the extent of transatlantic exchanges. My narrative picked 
up at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, which also saw the end of the related War of 1812 between 
the US and Britain. Considering these with the succession of transatlantic tensions associated with 
the wars of revolutionary France, and the prior disruption of the War of Independence, I would 
expect that American academics of Kent’s generation (Kent graduated from Yale in 1781) tended to 
have fewer transatlantic links that the generation that came before or those that came after. My 
detailed narrative ended in the opening years of the 20th century, shortly before World War One, 
which would, of course, also massively reshape transatlantic intellectual links. So assuming 
impacts from wars and technology, I would conjecture that the decades my book’s narrative 
covered were generally characterized by a step-by-step growth in transatlantic intellectual ties, 
sandwiched between disruptions before and after. 
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Turning from exchanges to a transatlantic comparison, let me now take up Berndtson’s concluding 
question: “[W]hy did the narrow political science not develop in Britain, Germany, or France”? He 
ponders if Crick (1959) was right to interpret this development as rooted in American culture. But I 
would look more to institutional than cultural factors. The development of narrow political science 
involved more than the idea of political science as just one among many social sciences (an idea 
that could have, and probably did, occur to figures in Europe too). It required academic conditions 
conducive for the successful institutionalization of that idea. I would conjecture that a key 
condition in which America was exceptional at the time of APSA’s creation was the rate of 
expansion and institutional innovation in its academy. As the twentieth century began America was 
several decades into a process of academic transformation that proliferated new institutions of 
multiple kinds at multiple levels. Entirely new universities—such as Cornell (1868), Johns Hopkins 
(1876), the University of Chicago (1890), and Stanford (1900)—had been opening at the same time 
as former colleges—such as Harvard and Columbia—underwent major reform and expansion. 
Entrepreneurial scholars based in the new and/or reforming universities led the way in 
establishing national level associations that promoted the social sciences and their advancing 
differentiation. My book focuses specifically on the American Historical Association (1884) and 
American Economics Association (1885), and a generation later, the APSA (1903). These can be 
situated, moreover, as part of a broader dynamic that also included the founding of the American 
Psychological Association (1892), American Anthropological Association (1902), and American 
Sociological Society (1905). Recognizing the broader condition of rapid academic expansion and 
institutional innovation helps make sense of how the idea of a narrow political science embodied in 
APSA would be successfully institutionalized via the subsequent proliferation of freestanding 
departments of narrow political science such that these became the academic norm by the 1920s or 
so. The parallel story of sociology’s relative success in America further illustrates the import of 
broader academic conditions. While the idea of sociology was thoroughly European in origin, 
institutional academic space was created for it sooner, more rapidly, and more widely in America 
than Europe. If this conjecture about academic conditions being favorable to institutionalization of 
narrow political science is plausible for America, we may then extend it by asking if the post-WWII 
decades during which narrow political science later gained institutional traction in Britain, 
Germany, and France was an era of major academic expansion and reform. It was in Britain, but 
Boncourt and Berndtson would know better if this conjecture fits continental European cases or 
not.  
As important as broad conditions of rapid vs. slow vs. no expansion in the academy might be for 
promoting or inhibiting the institutionalization of new ways of organizing knowledge production, 
certainly further factors must be considered in explaining any particular successful founding. For 
example, when considering the founding of national associations for narrow political science in 
France in 1949, Britain in 1950, and West Germany in 1951, we would also stress international 
factors. Did America’s post-WWII power and prestige encourage European scholars to pay more 
attention and respect to narrow political science as first institutionalized there? How did the geo-
political context of the late 1940s shape the effort of the new UNESCO to promote international 
political science, which spurred the creation of the International Political Science Association in 
1949? When situated in a transatlantic comparison, the pioneering American creation of APSA is 
indeed exceptional, in no small part because it lacks the prominent role for international factors 
that appear important for the subsequent diffusion of narrow political science to other countries.  
In combination with my conjecture about exceptional academic conditions in turn of the century 
America, a second domestic factor I would stress in explaining the development there of narrow 
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political science is also institutional. Specifically, I would spotlight the state building that 
Berndtson flags earlier in his commentary. In early-twentieth-century America government was 
expanding its role at the same time as civil service reform remade the paths to public employment 
at local, state, and federal levels. I was struck when researching APSA’s founding by the role played 
by the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee and other public servants (Adcock 2014b: 
274). While later decades would see the creation of schools of public administration/policy that 
split the training of future civil servants and policy advice off from narrow political science in 
America, in its early decades public administration was the new field’s largest subfield, and the 
APSA provided a vibrant nexus between public service and the academy. Hauptmann notes, 
however, potential ambiguities in my conclusion’s paean to this lost age of relevance. To clarify I 
would stress more how civil service reform conceptually and institutionally remade the very 
character of “public service.” Ever since Lieber, pioneering American political scientists had 
avowed their commitment both to serve a public purpose and be non-partisan. But when a scholar 
like Sumner pursued a public role by writing in a vigorous style for non-academic audiences he was 
charged (notably by other academics) with being “partisan.” As civil service reform went from an 
ideal promoted by political scientists to an institutional reality, political scientists gained new ways 
to serve a public purpose—such as training future professional civil servants, doing policy research 
for professionalized audiences, and being appointed themselves to government posts on account of 
their professional knowledge and skills. Rather than a retreat, I see here the rise of new modes of 
public service premised on the conceptual/institutional division between political/partisan actors 
and professional service. If some political scientists—most famously, Woodrow Wilson—
successfully pursued a public role in the former mode, others who tried to do so failed, and it was 
the newer professionalized modes of non-partisan government service through which more could 
and did serve a public purpose during the heyday of political science’s relevance.  
 
LIBERALISM: METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
The terrain of liberalism is a contested one I did not plan to enter when I began researching the 
history of American political science. I set out to study uses of cross-national comparison and to 
situate these in the inheritance of methodological traditions from Europe: a naturalistic tradition 
among sociologists, and a historicist tradition in Ross’s historico-politics. But as I researched the 
substance of the comparisons actually made by Americans what especially struck me was a late-
nineteenth century cleavage cutting across the methodological traditions I had expected to focus 
on. The cleavage was between transatlantic comparisons situating America as: 1) an exceptional 
nation that ought to be wary of European examples, vs. 2) a laggard with lessons to learn from one 
or another European country. Interwoven with skeptical vs. optimistic attitudes toward the 
expansion of government’s roles in an industrializing society, this cleavage suggested that what 
political scientists saw when making comparisons was shaped more by political visions than by 
methodology. In reframing my dissertation to spotlight this cleavage, I built upon an advisor’s 
suggestion that the political visions I was finding were varieties of liberalism, and interpreted the 
cleavage as one between “disillusioned classical liberals” vs. “progressive liberals.” Reframing my 
research in terms of liberalism led into a series of challenges well illuminated by questions raised in 
the commentaries. I welcome their impetus to revisit methodological and substantive choices I 
made in relating pioneering American political scientists to the history of liberalism.  
Boncourt spotlights the methodological difference between my approaches to “liberalism” and to 
“political science.” For the latter, as discussed earlier, I ended up relying on the way American 
scholars situated themselves, especially as formalized in the naming of chairs, departments, and 
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schools. By contrast, when interpreting these scholars as varieties of “liberals” I projected onto 
them a label they did not apply to themselves. Boncourt asks how my narrative would differ if I had 
fully embraced an actor-centric approach. I think that doing so would make it hard or even 
impossible to present a narrative pivoting on the evolving political visions of political scientists. 
Most American political scientists, from Lieber down to today, have believed in an ideal of non-
partisan scholarship. We might see their not labeling themselves as “liberals” as of a piece with 
them not labeling themselves “Democrats,” “Whigs,” or “Republicans.” Boncourt’s query makes 
clear that I could have better introduced my methodological choices by explicitly noting that, in 
narrating the substance of political science as shaped by political visions, I pursued a project that 
interprets the scholarship of political scientists in a way that sits in some tension with the self-
understanding many of them have regarding what they try to achieve in their scholarship. 
If some element of projection is necessary to map political labels onto political scientists, the key 
methodological issue becomes not if, but what, and how to project. My choice to project “liberal” 
brought my study of the history of political science into the orbit of the huge heated literature on 
the history of liberalism. As Boncourt notes, a common move in this literature is to project one’s 
own understanding of liberalism onto the past.2 A recent, methodologically self-conscious, and 
substantively excellent example is Edmund Fawcett’s Liberalism: The Life of an Idea. Explicitly 
disavowing actual usage of the word “liberalism” as a poor guide, Fawcett (2014: 6, 10) projects his 
own clearly stipulated view of the ideas constituting liberalism. The narrative he proceeds to unfold 
parallels mine in key respects. It picks up at the end of the Napoleonic wars and presents 
Americans alongside figures from France, Britain, and Germany. But Fawcett connects his array of 
figures by interpreting them through the common lens of the ideas he has stipulated. I instead 
sought as much as possible to connect figures by documenting historical links between them. In 
focusing especially on transatlantic ties, I sought a bridge over which to project historical uses of 
“liberal” and “liberalism” from nineteenth-century Europe onto American scholars of the period. 
By projecting within a transatlantic historical context, I aimed (perhaps quixotically) to reconcile 
projection with the methodological preference I drew from Farr and Gunnell for taking seriously 
the language of the past. Reflecting back on my choices I wish I had also attended to the way that 
pioneering American political scientists, although they did not call themselves liberal, did use the 
word. For example, Lieber wrote a “Liberal” entry for the Encyclopedia Americana he edited, and 
Wilson published paeans to the British Liberal party leaders Gladstone, Cobden, and Bright. 
Documenting the substance (and positive valence) of “liberal” in such pieces might make clearer 
that, while projecting this label onto American political scientists, I sought also to be sensitive to 
language usage within the transatlantic historical context I situated them in, with this usage itself 
including the way American political scientists wrote about liberals in Europe. 
Berndtson questions, however, if some of the Europeans I discuss are really liberals. He 
perceptively points here to a challenge I skated over in the book. While my efforts to project 
“liberal” within a transatlantic context focused on documenting ties to bridge the Atlantic, I was 
 
2 This is what Hartz (1955) did in his history of American liberalism, and following Hartz’s lead, what Crick (1959) did in 
his history of American political science. The view of Hartz, Crick, and other scholars who see liberalism in Lockean 
terms involves projecting “liberalism” back from the nineteenth century onto the early modern era, and the 
accompanying enshrining of Locke as the ur-liberal. Duncan Bell shows that this enshrining was a twentieth century 
reworking of liberalism in his “What is Liberalism?” (2016: chap. 3). Where Berndtson groups Locke with Grotius and 
Montesquieu as a “foundation for liberalism” widely taught in colonial America, I would see this trio as advancing rule of 
law ideas that liberals later reworked to leave behind the natural law basis of early-modern rule of law ideas. 
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sketchy at best in documenting how liberalism was evolving in various European nations in the 
decades covered. If Bluntschli should be labeled liberal relative to the shifting politics of Germanic 
Europe is a great question I would have to punt to those better versed in the relevant political 
history. But Berndtson’s accompanying question about Maine raises a challenge I did consider with 
more care. My book interprets Maine beside Spencer as British examples of a “disenchanted 
classical liberalism” that Sumner and Lowell exemplify for me in America. This transatlantic 
grouping is based on a web of ties I am confident in. But my label for the group is contentious. 
While I worked on my book several colleagues suggested labeling it conservative—advice that 
would have led to Liberalism, Conservativism and the Emergence of American Political Science, 
just as Berndtson envisions. But I limited my re-labeling to a tweak: the “disillusioned classical 
liberals” of my dissertation became “disenchanted classical liberals” in the book. Why persist in 
calling them liberals? First, because the liberal vs. conservative issue was forcefully addressed by 
Spencer, who saw his views as true liberalism while criticizing Britain’s Liberal Party for becoming 
a “New Toryism” as it came to favor new roles for the state (1982/1884). To call Spencer’s views 
conservative would be to take sides and assert by default that the “new liberalism” developing in 
late-century Britain (and the parallel progressive liberalism in America) had better claim to the 
liberal label. Second, because a similar debate over what constitutes true “liberalism” subsequently 
occurred in America in the 1920s and 1930s until FDR’s use combined with his political dominance 
to settle the American sense of “liberal” as meaning support for greater state roles. Third, because 
recent decades have seen, in contrast to this now longstanding American sense of liberalism, use of 
“neo-liberalism” to identify state-skeptical thinkers and politicians. I sought to narrate liberalism’s 
past in such a way that readers who connect my history to debates in the present could see why 
both strands of thought could justifiably be identified as liberal. To sum up, I believe that applying 
“liberal” to both sides of the late-nineteenth century cleavage I presented positions us today to see 
that this cleavage was never really transcended, with the subsequent history of liberalism in no 
small part a story of the ebb and flow of sub-traditions descending from each side of this critical 
cleavage. 
Speculating about twentieth-century liberalisms bring us to Hauptmann’s questions about the 
extent to which American political scientists influenced subsequent developments in American 
liberalism. Her focal point here is the claim I make when opening and closing my book (2014a: 2, 
280) that political scientists were “agents” in the “Americanization of liberalism.” My intent when 
initially formulating this claim was less ambitious that I now realize it reads. I chose to talk of 
“agency” to make a point about how the political scientists I studied related to the influences on 
them. I did not want to replace Crick’s (1959) portrait of American political scientists as 
mouthpieces of an already liberal culture with a portrait of them as passively importing European 
liberal beliefs. My aim was to persuade readers that pioneering political scientists did “more than 
just embody and express liberal beliefs.” They were agents because they “adapted liberal 
arguments to address American challenges and audiences” and thereby were “active participants in 
the transatlantic transformation of the liberal tradition” (2014a: 2). Hauptmann’s questions make 
clear, however, that when I conclude my book with a sketch of scenes from the “Americanization of 
‘liberalism’” that leads to a closing sentence re-stating my agency claim (now with the adjective 
“lead” added to make political scientists “lead agents”), I imply a claim, not only about how 
political scientists stood in relative to influence upon them, but also about their influence in turn.  
So let me close by speculating on how I might flesh out the agency of political scientists in the sense 
Hauptmann brings to the fore. Agency in my limited sense of active adaptation of influences is 
something I would claim for all the scholars I studied, but agency in the sense of influence upon 
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American political life would be more varied. I could see claiming anywhere from no/minimal to 
major influence depending on the figure. I would also distinguish between influence on political 
visions and influence specifically on the use of “liberal” to talk about those visions. An exemplar 
from my book of the first kind of influence is Richard Ely. My account of Ely suggests he had an 
exceptional ability to spur new ways of thinking in others. I presented him as leading his patron 
Andrew Dickson White to leave behind an earlier embrace of laissez-faire, and transforming the 
way his Hopkins’ students Albert Shaw and Woodrow Wilson thought about economics. These 
were more than intra-academic influences. They speak also to the cross-party political impact of 
Ely’s progressive vision. White was a Republican, former state legislator, and leading American 
diplomat; Shaw another Republican who would edit for decades a mass-circulation progressive 
magazine; and Wilson a transformative Democratic president. A fuller study of Ely would also 
chart pathways of influence through PhD students that he taught after moving to the University of 
Wisconsin (such as John R. Commons), through his role in the social gospel movement, and the 
impact of his textbooks on undergraduates. Ely has a strong claim to be the most important 
intellectual influence on the formation of progressivism as an American political vision. This is far 
from a novel claim, and the novelty in my own treatment of Ely is to make this much studied figure 
part of the history of political science through my conception of wide political science. 
 The narrow political science intertwined with the founding of the APSA does not stand out with 
regard to the political visions I charted, but does do so with regard to the entry of “liberal” into 
American politics. Progressivism could have developed as a political vision in America without 
becoming attached to the language of liberalism. Indeed, if elaborating my conclusion’s sketch of 
how this attachment developed in 1913-1916, I might speculate that it was highly contingent and 
that it was promoted by the political-public-academic connections mediated by the APSA in its 
early years. The critical juncture here is Woodrow Wilson’s defeat of Theodore Roosevelt in the 
election of 1912. If Roosevelt had won the presidency as the Progressive Party candidate the word 
“liberal” might never have entered American political life. It is specifically in the aftermath of this 
defeat that we find intellectuals favoring the active state championed by the Progressive Party shift 
from “progressive” to “liberal” to re-brand their political vision. The first such use I have found of 
“liberal” is in the 1913 speech of future APSA president William F. Willoughy printed in the 
American Political Science Review in early 1914. In my conclusion I move from this initial use to 
the subsequent better-known uses in the New Republic. But to avoid being too speculative, I 
avoided pointing out there that the New Republic’s lead editor Herbert Croly was an APSA 
member, and indeed served on its executive council during 1912-14. Moreover, Walter Weyl of the 
New Republic was also an APSA member in this period, and had given a paper at the 1912 APSA 
conference shortly after Wilson’s presidential victory. These associational ties hint at the 
tantalizing possibility that conversations at the APSA might have been a crucial venue in which the 
new American use of “liberal” was tried out and spread to the New Republic figures who then gave 
it a broader circulation. What we do know from existing research is that the New Republic’s use of 
“liberal” in 1916 was soon thereafter followed by Wilson making the word part of his own 
presidential rhetoric in his famous “Peace without Victory” speech to the US Senate in January 
1917. Wilson (1971: 538-39) provocatively declared: “I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking 
for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty. … These are 
American Principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the 
principles of and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, 
of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.” I would 
conjecture that Wilson’s charged equating of “liberals” with “American Principles” catapulted the 
word into a broad orbit and motivated competing visions in American political life to lay claim to it 
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in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, it is probably no accident that the contest to define the term is 
most famously captured in the dueling uses of Herbert Hoover and FDR, both of whom had served 
in Wilson’s administration. 
If Wilson had not won election in 1912, and “liberal” had never entered American political life, the 
development and cleavage of political visions charted in my book would have been the same. But 
there would be much less of a motivation for me to project “liberal” onto those visions. Both my 
book, and many other histories of liberalism, would look profoundly different if not for the 
contingent entry of “liberal” into American politics. If political science did indeed mediate this 
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